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Abstract
We undertake an empirical assessment of the competitiveness and market contestability of
the major British banks post-1980 – a period of major structural changes, mergers,
demutualizations and acquisitions.  Specifically, we estimate and test the Rosse-Panzar model
on a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980-2004; furthermore, we buttress the Rosse-Panzar
methodology by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from interest rate setting
equations. The sample of banks corresponds closely to the major British Banking Groups as
specified by the British Banking Association. Our results confirm the consensus finding that
the British banking market can be described as monopolistically competitive.  We also find
that on the core business of balance sheet activity, British banks have remained as
competitive in the 1990s as in the 1980s.  This finding is further supported by evidence from
the ratio of Lerner indices for loans and deposits.  However, we find a significant worsening
of competitiveness on the non-core (off-balance sheet) business of the banks.
Keywords: Competitive conditions; market contestability; British banking
JEL Classification Nos: G21; D43; C51
Corresponding Author: K. Matthews, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University,
Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU.  Tel: +44-(0)2920 875855, e-mail:
matthewsk@cardiff.ac.uk
11. Introduction
British banking has been in a state of almost continuous evolution since the Competition and
Credit Control Act of 1971. However, it was the abolition of exchange control in 1979 and
the abolition of the last of the quantitative controls on bank lending that heralded a period of
rapid deregulation and competition in British banking. The 1980s was the period of real
deregulation. The Corset was abolished in 1980, required reserves were abolished in 1981
Hire Purchase controls, which had restricted consumer borrowing, were abolished in 1982.
Furthermore the Building Societies Act (1986) enabled the Building Societies to compete
directly in the retail banking market. The 1980s saw a period of mergers of Building Societies
and the late 1980s and the 1990s saw a number of the larger Societies de-mutualising and
converting into banks. In the context of rapidly changing competition and merger activity in
the retail banking sector, this study poses the question: How has competitive conditions in the
UK retail banking sector changed since the deregulatory period of the 1980s? To answer this
question, we invoke econometric techniques to empirically assess the competitive conditions
in, and therefore the market contestability1 of, the major banks in Great Britain.
This paper undertakes an empirical assessment of the competitiveness and market
contestability of the major British banks during the 1980s and 1990s.  The methodology used
is the Rosse-Panzar approach to modelling the competitive conditions and contestability of
banks. Specifically we examine if the conditions of competitiveness and contestability have
altered between the 1980s and 1990s by estimating Rosse-Panzar H statistics separately for
the total output of banks and the core output of banks. The robustness of the empirical results
for the core output of banks is tested by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices for loans and
deposits.
                                                
1 In the sense of Baumol (1982) and Baumol et. al. (1982).
2The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section details
developments in British banking in the period 1980-2004. Section 3 presents the theory of
competitiveness and contestability; effectively, this is the framework that theoretically
underpins the analysis. The data and the empirical model are discussed in Section 4.  The
estimation and results are reported in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes.
2. British Banking during 1980-2004
While the introduction of Competition and Credit Control in 1971 (CCC) signaled the
beginning of the process of deregulation, it is well recognized that the 1979 Banking Act
represented the starting point of a permanent change in the competitive character of British
banking (Pozdena and Hotti, 1985). The abolition of the clearing bank cartel arrangements in
1971 and the hope of a 'market-based' approach to the control of credit through interest rates
soon gave way to the re-appearance of quantitative controls in 1973, in the wake of the rapid
growth of bank credit and the secondary banking crisis. The decade of the 70s was
punctuated with imposition and relaxation of quantitative controls in the form of controls in
the growth of bank liabilities and the call of Supplementary Special Deposits that severely
compromised the spirit of the purpose of CCC. The Banking Act regularized banking
supervision by extending the supervisory authority of the Bank of England to all deposit
taking institutions except for Building Societies. Deposit taking institutions were separated
into 'recognized banks' and 'licensed deposit takers', but more significantly, the Banking Act
provided a mechanism by which non-bank institutions could enter the retail banking market,
removing a former barrier to entry2. A further important concession to clearing bank
                                                
2 The 1987 Act effectively removed the distinction.  While the conversion from licensed deposit-taker to retail
bank has not been rapid following the legislation, the number of retail banks in 1984 was 140 and the most
recent statistics from the British Banking Association suggest a membership of 250 institutions (see
www.bba.org.uk).
3competitors was access to the Clearing House system and the widening market for retail
demand deposits.
The abolition of exchange controls in 1979 removed an important form of protection
from international competition. Time deposits would have to pay the same return as
equivalent maturity euro-sterling deposits. Competition increased further with the break-up of
the Building Societies cartel in 1983. The Building Societies Act created room for more
competition in banking with the provision for banking services, unsecured lending, credit
cards, and commercial loans of up to 10% of assets.
The deregulatory trend was extended to the Stock Exchange, with the deregulation of
the financial markets. With the 'Big Bang' in 1986, the banks became more aggressive in the
marketing and positioning of their off-balance sheet products and services. Many banks
entered the securities business acquiring stock broking and jobbing firms while non-banking
financial institutions, such as insurers, retailers and building societies, challenged the banks
on their traditional balance sheet activity.
The rest of the period from 1987 - 2003 saw a number of demutualization’s,
consolidations, mergers, acquisitions and diversification that affected the banking sector.
Abbey National was the first Building Society to convert to plc status in 1989. Banks took
over Building Societies (Lloyds with Cheltenham and Gloucester). After 1995, there were a
number of demutualizations of Building Societies (Halifax, Alliance and Leicester, Northern
Rock, Woolwich and Bradford and Bingley) and Building Society acquisitions by banks
(Bristol and West by Bank of Ireland Group and Birmingham and Midshires by Halifax). In
1995 Lloyds and TSB merged to form the Lloyds-TSB group, Barclays took-over Woolwich
in 2000 and the Royal Bank of Scotland acquired National Westminster in the same year. In
2001 Bank of Scotland and Halifax merged to form the HBOS group.
4The number of mergers, consolidations and acquisitions that occurred during the
1990s and in the new century might suggest an increase in concentration and worsening of
competition. However, the evidence from the data sample used in this paper would suggest
otherwise. Moreover, the market structural indicators measured by the asset-based 2-bank
concentration ratio, 5-bank concentration ratio and HHI3 show a modest decline in the second
half of the the 1990s compared with the earlier period (Table 1). Although too much cannot
be read into aggregate measures of concentration and HHI because of the competitive
potential that arises from contestability, it can at least be argued that mergers and acquisitions
during the 1990s have not altered market concentration appreciably.
 Table 1 below presents concentration and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) for
the sample period (a detailed discussion of the data is left to section 4).
Table 1
 Concentration Ratios and HHI for the Biggest Two and Biggest Five Banks
Year/Measure CR2 CR5 HHI
1986 0.421 0.767 1428.470
1991 0.441 0.738 1423.817
1996 0.316 0.630 1051.831
2002 0.383 0.688 1249.696
There have been remarkably few studies of competitiveness of UK banks relating to
the two decades of the 20th century. A notable exception is Heffernan (1993) and (2002) who
                                                
3 The U.S. Department of Justice considers a market with a result of less than 1,000 to be a competitive marketplace; a result
of 1,000-1,800 to be a moderately concentrated marketplace; and a result of 1,800 or greater to be a highly concentrated
marketplace. As a general rule, mergers that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in concentrated markets raise antitrust
concerns.
5examined competition in the retail banking market in the 1980s in the former study and the
1990s in the latter.  Heffernan examines deposit rate, loan rate, mortgage rate, and credit card
rate setting behavior of individual banks and Building Societies from econometric models of
interest rate equations using monthly panel data. The results indicate an increase in
competition in the mortgage market and low interest checking accounts, but show the
existence of price discrimination behavior in other products. The findings suggest that the
retail banking sector in Britain is best described as monopolistic competition based on
imperfect information, particularly in the case of unsecured loans and credit card rate setting
behavior. Cournot type behavior was evident in the credit card market as interest rate setting
was sensitive to the number of suppliers.
The government enquiry into competition in UK Banking, as per the report by
Cruikshank (2000), concluded that while the market for personal retail banking was
consistent with monopolistic competition as evidenced by sustained abnormal return, there
were signs of 'new entry and increased competition'  that would improve information flows
and result in a convergence of pricing. The report recognized that banking involves 'joint
products' or 'bundled' services that can lead to overpricing and underpricing on different
products. However, new entrants target specific banking products and even though they may
be part of a larger banking group. They often specialize in such products as mortgages,
unsecured loans, and credit cards, which have dynamic effects on improving competition in
those niche markets.
Other studies have examined the UK bank competitiveness in the context of wider
studies of international bank competition using the Rosse-Panzar approach followed in this
paper4. These studies typically use a panel set of data provided by Fitch/Bankscope and
                                                
4 For example Molyneux et. al. (1994), Bikker and Haaf (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2004) and most recently
Casu and Girardone (2005).
6include a large number of banks in a country irrespective of specialist practice (in the case of
the UK, many individual banks are either wholly owned or partially owned by larger parent
banks that constitute the major British banks). The advantage of such studies is that they deal
with the aggregate of banking activity in a country and provide a snapshot of competitive
conditions in totality. The disadvantage, as Llewellyn (2005) notes, is that aggregate studies
disguise the areas of banking that have strong competition from those that do not, which can
only be revealed by more micro based studies of specific banking markets. Banking studies
using the Rosse-Panzar approach with aggregate data have to be interpreted as an
examination of competitive conditions for the package of banking services rather than
specific banking markets.
3. An Illustrative Model
The theory of competitiveness and contestability assumes that firms can enter or leave rapidly
any market without losing their capital, and that potential competitors possess the same cost
functions as firms that already serve in the market.  The key argument is that if the market is
contestable, the threat of market entry with price-cutting by potential competitors enforces
marginal cost pricing by incumbents, so that in equilibrium they will not earn excess profits
and no entry is observed to occur.
To illustrate the theory, it is helpful to reproduce the relevant arguments in the model
by Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) as well as the extensions
made by Nathan and Neave (1989) and Perrakis (1991).
The model considers a profit-maximizing firm in an oligopolistic industry.  It is
assumed that industry output, given by Y, is scalar, which is a simplifying assumption given
that banks are multi-product firms, and P is the prevailing price of bank output.  The inverse
7demand curve is given by P(Y); and the output of the kth firm, where there is k = 1, ……, n
firms, is given by yk.  Profit maximization conditions are given by:
),,()()( kkykkk ZWyCYPylYP =′+ (1)
where lk ≡ dY/dyk is the conjectural variation of industry output in response to a change in yk;
P’ ≡ dP/dY; Cyk is the marginal cost of firm k; W = vector of input prices; and Zk = a vector of
exogenous parameters in the firm’s maximization problem.  Hence, equation (1) determines
yk as a function of W, Y and Zk for every k.  Aggregate demand, which determines Y in short
run equilibrium is given by:
∑
=
=
n
k
kk ZWYyY
1
),,( (2)
To model the degree of competitiveness of the banks in this oligopoly setting, it is
necessary to proceed from the term )(YPyl kk ′  in equation (1) and set LYyl kk = for all k,
where the parameter L is independent of industry output Y.  Thus, the two limiting cases are
derived as follows.  For L = 0; the perfectly competitive case is derived from (1), where price
equals marginal cost.  For L = 1, the perfect collusion case is derived.
In equation (1), if we denote )()( YPylYP kk ′+  by F(Y), this implies that
( )[ ]eLYPYF −= 1)()( , where the price elasticity of demand is given by )()( YPYYPe ′−≡ .
Hence, if the equation is written as ( )[ ] ),,()(1)( kkyk ZWyCYFeLYP ==− , it is inferred that
e > L, such that equilibrium is consistent with any value of e.  It is also assumed that the
marginal cost is log-linear such that under market equilibrium conditions:
 ∑
=
+++=
3
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210 lnlnlnln
i
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8Where wi, i = 1,2,3 are the prices of three potential inputs. To characterize the output of the
kth firm, we substitute (3) into (1) and solve to obtain, after some re-arrangement:
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Thus the main factors are Y, W and Z, thus [ ]kk ZWYFGy ,),(= , where G is increasing in
F(Y).  If we substitute yk into the market equilibrium conditions in equation (2) and
differentiate with respect to L, it is found that industry output varies inversely with the
parameter L, such that parameter L is an appropriate measure of the competitiveness of the
industry; thus, L = 0 suggests the perfectly competitive case, where price equals marginal
cost, while L = 1 suggests the perfect collusion and oligopoly case.
By substituting into equation (4), the constant elasticity of the form of the industry
P(Y) and F(Y), as denoted by their log-linear forms, we see that the kth firm’s Pyk can be
stated as:
∑
=
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3
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i
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where Ei = -Bi(1-e) / (e + A1) and Rk = the kth firm reduced form revenue.
For estimation and testing purposes, we cast equation (5) in empirical form, as
follows:
uBRASSET
RISKASSPFPKPLREV
+++
++++=
lnln
lnlnlnlnln
65
43210
αα
ααααα
(6)
9where, REV = ratio of bank revenue to total assets; PL = personnel expenses to employees
(unit price of labour); PK = capital expenses to fixed assets (unit price of capital); PF = ratio
of annual interest expenses to total loanable funds (unit price of funds). The exogenous bank
specific factors are;  RISKASS  which measures the riskiness of the bank's overall portfolio
given by the ratio of provisions to total assets; ASSET is a proxy for size and measures the
extent of scale economies; BR  is the ratio of the number of branches of each bank to the total
number of branches of the whole banking system. Branching has been viewed as a traditional
way of maintaining market share by providing consumers with close-quarter access to
financial services, mitigating to some extent price competition5.
The H-statistic is calculated from reduced form revenue equations and measures the
sum of elasticities of total revenue of the firm with respect to the firm’s input prices.  For
example, in the context of equation (5), the H-statistic is defined as the sum of the elasticities
of Pyk with respect to the variables in the wi vector, hence, ∑
=
=
3
1i
iEH , which implies that H=
A1(1-e)/(e + A1), which means H can be negative or positive.  Rosse and Panzar (1977),
Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) show that the H-statistic is negative (H<0) when this
structure is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a conjectural variation short-run
oligopoly, as under these conditions an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs,
reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce total firm revenue.  In contrast, the H-
statistic is equal to one (H=1) when there is perfect competition, as any increase in input
prices increases both marginal and average costs without altering the optimal output of any
individual firm.  H is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in a perfectly contestable
                                                
5 See Northcott (2004) But also branching is a component of cost and there will be a trade-off between
maintaining market share and increasing cost of branch maintenance.
10
market and also for a sales-maximising firm subject to break-even constraints.  If 0<H<1, this
is a case of monopolistic competition.
An important feature of the H-statistic is that the tests must be undertaken on
observations that are in long run equilibrium.  This suggests that competitive capital markets
will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of
returns should not be correlated statistically with input prices.  Thus, in the context of the
theory of competitiveness and contestability set out in the model above, we specify a model
for obtaining measures of the competitive banking environment by including a specification
for equilibrium conditions:
εββ
βββββ
+++
++++=
BRASSET
RISKASSPFPKPLROA
lnln
lnlnlnlnln
65
43210 (7)
where, ROA = net profits to total assets; and the remaining variables are as above for equation
(6).  The full definition of these variables is given in the Appendix.
Table 2
The theory and interpretation of the H-statistic
Equilibrium test
H = 0 Equilibrium
H < 0 Disequilibrium
Competitive conditions
H ≤ 0 Monopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly
H = 1 Perfect competition or natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market or
sales maximising firm subject to a break even constraint
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic competition
11
Hence, to test for equilibrium, the Rosse-Panzar statistic is calculated with the return
on assets (equity) replacing bank revenue as the left hand variable in the regression equation.
If we find that H < 0, we infer market disequilibrium; whereas H=0 would indicate
equilibrium.
Table 2 summarises these theoretical underpinnings of the main theory for measuring
competitiveness and contestability in the banking market, including the tests for equilibrium
conditions.
4. Data and Methodology
The data source was Annual Reports of individual banks and Annual Abstract of Banking
Statistics (British Bankers Association). The data sample broadly corresponds to the British
Banker Association (BBA) Major British Banking Groups (MBBG), covering 7 of the total 9
big banking groups in MBBG6 but excluding Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock Plc7
and including Standard Chartered Plc8. Specifically, the sample included Abbey National Plc
(1985-2004), Alliance & Leicester Plc (1994-2004), Barclays Plc (1985-2004), Woolwich Plc
(1996-2002)9, Halifax Plc (1986-2004), Bank of Scotland (1986-2004)10, Midland Bank Plc
                                                
6 The total 9 banking groups in MBBG account for approximately 80% of all private sector sterling deposits
held at banks and sterling lending by all banks to UK residents (see http://www.bba.org.uk).
7 North Rock Plc and Bradford & Bingley Plc became a member of MBBG in 1999 and 2000 respectively after
converting from a building society to a bank.
8 Standard Chartered Group was a component of the MGGB before 1997. The reason why Standard Chartered is
included but Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock are excluded lies in our central concern on the dynamics of
the intensity of the competition during the past two decades. Standard Chartered has been actively operating in
the retailing banking market whereas Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock Plc demutualized late in the
sample period. The inclusion of Standard Chartered Plc would be more pertinent to the estimation and
moreover, the sum of key operational indicators of Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock Plc, such as total
assets, total revenue, total deposits and total loans, is less than that of Standard Chartered.
9 Woolwich Plc was absorbed by Barclays Bank Plc in 2000, and an annual report is not available after 2003.
10 In 2001, Halifax Plc and Bank of Scotland merged to form HBOS group, but separate annual report for both
bank is still available thereafter.
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11(1980-2004), Lloyds-TSB bank Plc (1982-2004)12, The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (1984-
2003), National Westminster Bank Plc(1980-2003) and Standard Chartered Plc (1985-2004).
The former 10 banks are the major banks in each of the 7 groups, and more
importantly they are commonly either the sole owner (100% share stake) or the controlling
owner (at least 50% share stake) of the rest of banks belonging to the same group. The
dominant shareholder role they play motivates our employment of the consolidated annual
data for those banks. Consequently, the data captures an overall picture of the 7 groups. One
exception is the Royal Bank of Scotland acquisition of National Westminster in 2000. To
avoid double counting, we utilised unconsolidated data for The Royal Bank of Scotland
during the period of 2001-2003, while continuing with the consolidated data for National
Westminster. In sum, our data consists of 12 banks covering an uneven time frame 1980-
2004 with a total number of bank years of 219.
Equations (6) and (7) are estimated and tested on the data as an unbalanced panel,
thus exploiting both the time series as well as the cross-section dimensions. To allow for
heterogeneity across the sample of banks, we use the error-component method. However, it
should be noted that previous studies that have employed the Rosse-Panzar methodology tend
to use a large number of banks and a small number of time periods. In contrast, the sample
used in this study has a small number of banks but constituting the majority of asset share,
and a long period of time. The period 1980-2004 covers two recessions; the 1980-81
recession and 1991-92 recession. It is well known that the profitability and revenue of a bank
is highly sensitive to the business cycle. Bad debts and non-performing loans vary positively
with the business cycle and accounting conventions mean that the timing of a default does not
                                                
11 HSBC banking group acquired Midland in 1992, but the annual report was continually made separately from
the consolidated accounts of HSBC Bank Plc.
12 The annual data for Lloyds Bank Plc is from 1982 to 1994, while the annual data for TSB Bank Plc is from
1984-2004. In 1995, two banks merged to form Lloyds TSB Bank Plc.
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invariably coincide with the turning point of the recession, so bank performance may lead or
lag the business cycle13.  Figure 1 below shows the movement of the weighted average ROA
for the sample of banks (weighted by asset share) against real GDP growth.
Figure 1: Weighted ROA and real GDP growth
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The dotted line is real GDP growth and is read from the left-hand scale while the firm line is
weighted ROA and can be read from the right-hand scale. It can be seen that there is a strong
correspondence between the two measures although at times ROA lags growth and at other
times it leads growth. Bank revenue and profit functions that ignore measures of the business
cycle will be dynamically misspecified and could result in omitted variables bias if the
included variables are correlated with excluded variable14. The equations to be estimated are
                                                
13 See Cruikshank (2000) Appendix C.
14 It is strongly likely that the input prices and total assets will be correlated with GDP growth.
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modified to include a pure time series variable - real GDP growth and described by (6') and
(7')15.
ittitit
ititititit
uGROWTHBRASSET
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++++=
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43210
lnln
lnlnlnlnln
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ααααα
(7')
where i denotes banks and i = 1...N ; and t denotes time t = 1....T . The model assumes a one-
way error component model as described by:
itiit vu += µ (8)
where iµ denotes the unobservable bank specific effect and itv denotes a random term which
is assumed to be IID. The H statistic is obtained as 321 ααα ++=H . Similarly:
ittitit
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(7')
and itiit υηε += (9)
where iη is the bank specific effect and itυ is an IID random error. The banking market is
deemed to be in equilibrium if 0321 =++ βββ .
The Rosse-Panzar methodology is only one of a number of ways of modelling
competitiveness16. Uchida and Tsutsui (2004) use the Cournot oligopoly version of the
Monti-Klein model of the banking firm to derive a loan interest rate setting function in terms
of the cost of funds and marginal operational costs of servicing loans and deposits. The
estimated coefficient on the cost of funds (deposit rate) is the ratio of the Lerner indices of
                                                
15 Coccorese (2004) recognises the role of regional macroeconomic indicators in assessing bank competition in
Italy.
16 See also Bresnahan (1982) and Bresnahan (1997).
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loans and deposits adjusted for the number of competitor banks. As the number of competitor
banks increase, the ratio of the Lerner indices approaches unity, which is the perfect
competition case17.
This study buttresses the H statistic obtained from the Rosse-Panzar methodology by
estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from loan interest rate setting equations. In
this way the robustness of the estimated results using the Rosse-Panzar method can be tested
using an alternative methodology. The next section presents the empirical results and answers
the question whether competitiveness in the 1990s worsened compared with the 1980s
focussing separately on the traditional and non-traditional activity of banking business.
5. Empirical Analysis
The reduced form functions have, as the dependent variable, both the logarithm of total
revenue and interest revenue, respectively. The inclusion of non-interest revenue recognises
the importance of non-interest income and fee earnings to bank profitability18. We test for
differences between the 1980s and 1990s by using intercept and slope dummies for input
prices. The dummy variable takes the value zero for 1980-91 and unity for 1992-2004. The
period was chosen both because it represented an approximate halfway point in the time
dimension of the data but more so because 1991 was the end of the 1991-2 recession, so the
first half of the period captures a full business cycle.  Our starting point is to test if the British
banking market is in long-run equilibrium. Table 3 presents the results for ln ROA as
described by equation (8').
                                                
17 See Freixas and Rochet (2002) for a formal derivation.
18 A number of studies use total bank revenue; for example De Bandt and Davies (2000) and Casu and
Girardone (2005) but interest revenue is used by Molyneaux et. al. (1994), and Bikker and Haaf (2002).
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Table 3: Tests of Equilibrium.
Dependent variable ln ROA (t values in parenthesis)
Variable 1-way Fixed Effects 1-way Fixed Effects 2-Way Fixed Effects
Intercept 0.0265***
(3.82)
0.0234**
(2.03)
-.0020
(-0.10)
lnPL 0.0001
(0.12)
-.0004
(-0.30)
-.0024*
(1.69)
lnPK -.0016**
(-2.34)
-.0015
(-1.23)
0.0008
(0.63)
lnPF -.0009
(-0.96)
-.0014
(-0.56)
-.0086**
(-2.35)
DUM92 - 0.0047
(0.55)
0.0156
(0.45)
lnPL*DUM92 - 0.0004
(0.34)
0.0024*
(1.65)
lnPK*DUM92 - -.0004
(-0.24)
-.0019
(-1.25)
lnPF*DUM92 - 0.0010
(0.39)
0.0060
(1.58)
lnRISKASS -.6257***
(-13.41)
-.6213***
(-12.92)
-.6140***
(-10.60)
lnASSET -.0020***
(-3.34)
-.0019**
(-2.83)
-.0015*
(-1.71)
lnBR -.0016***
(-2.63)
-.0014*
(-1.84)
-.0007
(-0.72)
GROWTH 0.0007***
(4.38)
0.0007***
(3.98)
0.008
(0.30)
Lloyds-TSB DUM 0.0056***
(3.77)
0.0053***
(3.49)
0.0035**
(2.27)
Barclays DUM -.0008
(-0.22)
-.0004
(-0.11)
0.0005
(0.15)
R2 Within 0.6176 0.6190 0.7096
H0: 0=iη F(11,198) = 4.7***
Reject
F(11,194) = 4.1***
Reject
F(11,170) = 4.1***
Reject
H0: 0=tλ - - F(1,170) = 0.04
Accept
H0: H = 0 F(1.198) = 3.25
Accept
F(1,194) = 0.12
Accept
F(1,170) = 3.65
Accept
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
We allow for the Lloyds-TSB merger with a zero-one dummy (1995-2004 = 1, 0 otherwise)
and Barclays acquisition of Woolwich (2003-2004 = 1, 0 otherwise).  We also test for the 2-
way error component model (the 2-way error component disturbances are described by:
17
ittiit vu ++= λµ  where λt accounts for any time-specific effect that is excluded from the
regression)19.
The consistent result of Table 3 is that the sum of the input price elasticities, with and
without the slope dummies for 1992 sum to zero indicating that despite the dynamic changes
to British banking scene, the banking market was in long-run equilibrium throughout the
period. The 2-way error-component model is rejected (column 4) on the conventional level of
significance. It can also be seen that the growth of real GDP is a strong determinant of ROA
in the one-way fixed effects regression model but is insignificant when time dummies are
included in the 2-way error component model.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results using the logarithm of total bank revenue as a
fraction of total assets (ln TREV) and the log of interest revenue as a fraction of total assets
(ln INTREV) respectively. We present results for the 1-way error component and 2-way error
component model and we also test for any change in the H statistic by including shift and
slope dummies for the input price elasticities for the period 1992 onwards.  Table 4 presents
the results for ln TREV. Out of the three input price, the unit price of funds was the only
significant variable at the conventional level of significance - a finding that is also supported
by the most recent study using the Rosse-Panzar method with UK data20. The log of total
assets is a proxy for size and measures the extent of scale economies. The impact of this
variable on revenue suggests significant cost diseconomies.  The variable RISKSS measures
the riskiness of the bank's overall portfolio, measured by the ratio of provisions to total assets.
The effect of the risk measure on revenue is ambiguous. An increase in provisions is a
diversion of capital from earnings, which could have a negative effect on revenue.
                                                
19 Baltagi (2001)
20 See Casu and Girardone (2005)
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Table 4
 Dependent Variable ln TREV; t values in parenthesis
Variable 1-way FE 2-way FE 1-way FE 2-way FE
Intercept -.2891
(-1.48)
-.5928
(-0.96)
0.1131
(0.36)
-.9565*
(-1.78)
LnPL -.0084
-(0.46)
-.0109
(-0.56)
0.0200
(0.60)
-.0096
(-0.24)
LnPK 0.0008
(0.04)
0.0319
(1.58)
0.0417
(1.29)
0.0542
(1.56)
lnPF 0.5794***
(22.94)
0.4487***
(9.67)
0.6889***
(10.02)
0.6580***
(6.53)
DUM92 - - -.5700**
(-2.41)
-.2375
(-0.25)
lnPL*DUM92 - - -.0281
(-0.82)
-.0045
(-0.11)
lnPK*DUM92 - - -.0630
(-1.53)
-.0510
(-1.22)
lnPF*DUM92 - - -.1573**
(-2.16)
-.2478**
(-2.39)
lnRISKASS 3.1061**
(2.37)
2.8200*
(1.80)
3.0907**
(2.35)
2.6922*
(1.71)
lnASSET -.0571***
(-3.40)
-.0150
(-0.65)
-.0601***
(-3.19)
-.0050
(-0.21)
lnBR -.0486**
(-2.78)
-.0592***
(-3.17)
-.0592**
(-2.72)
-.0515**
(-2.10)
GROWTH -.0082*
(-1.89)
-.2805*
(-1.83)
-.0040
(-0.87)
-.1619
(-1.01)
Lloyds-TSB
DUM
0.0310
(0.74)
0.0504
(1.24)
0.0399
(0.95)
0.0585
(1.38)
Barclays DUM -.0002
(0.00)
0.1171
(1.23)
-.0177
(-0.19)
0.1089
(1.16)
R2 within 0.9211 0.9401 0.9257 0.9438
H 0.5718 0.4697 0.5022 0.3993
H0: H = 0 F(1,198) = 228.0
Reject ***
F(1,174) = 87.6
Reject ***
F(1,194) = 13.5
Reject ***
F(1,170) = 54.2
Reject ***
H0: H = 1 F(1,198) = 127.9
Reject ***
F(1,174) = 111.6
Reject ***
F(1,194) = 133.0
Reject ***
F(1,170) = 122.6
Reject ***
H0: ΣSlope
DUM92 = 0
- - F(1,194) =8.3
Reject ***
F(1,170) = 7.0
Reject ***
H0: 0=iµ F(11,198) = 21.4
Reject ***
F(11,174) = 16.2
Reject ***
F(11,194) = 19.8
Reject ***
F(11,170) = 16.2
Reject ***
H0: 0=tλ - F(1,173) = 2.8
Accept
- F(1,170) = 1.8
Accept
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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Table 5
 Dependent Variable ln INTREV; t values in parenthesis
Variable 1-way FE 2-way FE 1-way FE 2-way FE
Intercept -.3384
(-1.51)
-1.3904***
(-3.74)
-.3555
(-0.96)
-1.5172**
(-2.37)
lnPL -.0543***
-(2.60)
-.0420*
(-1.87)
-.0322
(-0.82)
-.0328
(-0.68)
lnPK -.0078
(0.35)
0.0032
(0.14)
0.0010
(0.03)
-.0064
(-0.15)
lnPF 0.7027***
(24.33)
0.6036***
(11.20)
0.6822***
(8.46)
0.6584***
(5.49)
DUM92 - - -.1078
(-0.39)
0.5743
(0.51)
lnPL*DUM92 - - -.0167
(-0.42)
-.0119
(-0.25)
lnPK*DUM92 - - -.0090
(-0.19)
0.0095
(0.19)
lnPF*DUM92 - - -.0002
(-0.00)
-.0596
(-0.48)
lnRISKASS 2.5519*
(1.70)
3.2812*
(1.80)
2.3283
(1.51)
3.1613*
(1.68)
lnASSET -.0488**
(-2.54)
.01565
(0.59)
-.0458**
(-2.07)
0.0134
(0.48)
lnBR -.0321*
(-1.65)
-.05579**
(-2.55)
-.0454*
(-1.78)
-.0581**
(-1.99)
GROWTH -.0072
(-1.51)
-.0996***
(-3.53)
-.0073
(-1.36)
-.2500
(-1.31)
Lloyds-TSB
DUM
0.0340
(0.71)
0.0712
(1.52)
0.0413
(0.84)
0.0786
(1.56)
Barclays DUM -.0176
(-.16)
.1529
(1.40)
-.0321
(-0.29)
0.1591
(1.43)
R2 within 0.9283 0.9444 0.9290 0.9447
H 0.6405 0.5648 0.6250 0.5573
H0: H = 0 F(1,198) = 218.8
Reject ***
F(1,174) = 93.0
Reject ***
F(1,194) = 152.7
Reject ***
F(1,170) = 74.6
Reject ***
H0: H = 1 F(1,198) = 69.0
Reject ***
F(1,174) = 55.2
Reject ***
F(1,194) = 54.9
Reject ***
F(1,170) = 47.0
Reject ***
H0: ΣSlope
DUM92 = 0
- - F(1,194) = 0.1
Accept
F(1,170) = 0.2
Accept
H0: 0=iµ F(11,198) = 7.1
Reject ***
F(11,174) = 5.6
Reject ***
F(11,194) = 6.1
Reject ***
F(11,170) = 5.3
Reject ***
H0: 0=tλ - F(1,174) = 12.4
Reject ***
- F(1,170) = 2.4
Accept
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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Alternatively, a higher level of provisions indicates a more risky loan portfolio and
consequently a higher level of compensating return and therefore a positive effect on revenue.
The effect of BR on total revenue suggests that the increased cost of maintaining a higher
branch network dominates the positive effects of maintaining market share.
A formal test for the time-specific error component in the 2-way error-component
regression is decisively rejected. We can therefore concentrate on the parameter estimates of
columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The results indicate strong support for the one-way error
component model against that of a pure 'pooled' regression model. A significance test on the
sum of the input price elasticities show that the 'H' statistic lies between zero and unity. The
slope dummies are jointly significant indicating a value for the H statistic that is significantly
lower in the second half of the period than in the first.
Table 5 presents the results for the case of interest revenue. At the outset, we can
reject the possibility of a difference in the estimated value of the 'H' statistic in both halves of
the sample.  An F test for the joint significance of the slope dummies on the input price
elasticities was decisively rejected, which means that we may concentrate on the estimates
shown in columns 2 and 3.  In contrast to the results in Table 4, we were unable to reject the
two-way error component regression model. The estimated 'H' statistic lies between zero and
unity and was constant throughout the full sample period.
The common elements in Tables 4 and 5 is the relative explanatory power of the price
of funds and the proportion of branches in the sample. The effect of size on interest revenue
was less robust than in the case of total revenue. However, the main result is that using
interest revenue as the dependent variable, our findings suggests that despite the many
changes to the banking system in Britain, competitiveness and contestability had not changed
significantly over the period 1980-2004.
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We may summarise the findings of the Rosse-Panzar method by comparing our
results for estimates of the H statistic with other studies that have examined the UK. Table 6
summarises.
Table 6
H Statistics
Author Variable Period Banks/FI H statistic
Molyneux et. al.
(1994)
Interest revenue 1986
1989
109
171
0.6282
0.8525
Bikker and Haaf
(2002)
Interest revenue 1991
1997
213 0.6100
0.64
Claessens and
Laeven (2004)
Interest revenue 1994-2001 106 0.74
Casu&Girardone
(2005)
Total revenue 1997-2003 63 0.307 -
0.327
This study Total revenue 1980-1991
1992-2004
10
12
0.7506
0.5022
This study Interest revenue 1980-2004 10-12 0.5648
The unanimous verdict of all these studies is that the British banking system can be
described as one of monopolistic competition.  However, if the H statistic can be interpreted
as a continuous variable we may infer that a high value for the statistic implies a higher level
of competitiveness than a lower level.
From Table 6 we can see that Molyneux et. al. (1994) and Bikker and Haaf (2002)
suggest that competitiveness has improved during the 1980s and between the beginning and
the end of the 1990s. Claessens and Laeven (2004) suggest that competitiveness has been
relative strong during the 1990s. In contrast Casu and Girardone (2005) estimate a relatively
low level of competitiveness.  The results of this paper confirm the mainstream finding that
the British banking market is one of monopolistic competition.
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We interpret the results of this paper in the following way. Competitiveness has
remained unchanged over the full time period if banking performance is measured with
respect to their core business. However, if non-interest income is included in the assessment,
then banking competitiveness has significantly worsened in the 1990s. An alternative
empirical test evaluates the robustness of the results and confirms our conclusion relating to
the core area of banking.
Following Ho and Saunders (1981), we decompose the rate of interest charged on
loans into cost of funds, real resource costs and risk. We estimate the following interest rate
equations for the sample of banks:
ititititLit RISKASSMCPFR ςγγγγ ++++= 3210 (10)
LitR is the average loan rate for bank i at time t; itPF  is the average cost of funds for bank i at
time t; MCit is a measure of the marginal cost of servicing deposits and loans of bank i at time
t; RISKASSit is a measure of risk defined as above; and itς  is a random term. The parameter
1γ is the ratio of the Lerner indices for deposits and loans and is a measure of market power.
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where eD is the interest elasticity of demand for deposits; eL is the aggregate interest elasticity
of demand for loans; ϑ is the average share of the bank deposit market b the banks; and θ is
the average share of the bank loan market by the banks.
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If the number of banks increases and the average shares in the deposit and loan
market decline or if the elasticities of deposits and loans get larger through an increase in
competition and substitution possibilities, the ratio of Lerner indices will tend to unity.  In the
extreme, if either the number of banks increases to infinity or the interest elasticity of loans
and deposits becomes infinite, 1γ =1. Under monopolistic competition, 1γ  is strictly greater
than unity. Vesala (1995) shows that in the case of monopolistic competition, H is an
increasing function of eL, so that the less market power exercised by banks (higher is 1γ ), the
lower is H.
The income statements of the banks do not separate interest revenue between interest
earned on loans and interest earned from other earning assets. Thus the ratio of interest
received to the sum of loans and other earning assets is a weighted average of the average
return on loans and the average return on other earning assets (RO).  We take the yearly
average of the 3-month interbank rate (RB) as a measure of the average return on other
earning assets (OEA) and define the dependent variable (RL) as follows:
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Figure 2:
 Scatter Plot of Estimated Average Interest on Loans
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If RB is a good proxy for RO, then RL will be measured with a non-systematic error,
which will be absorbed into the general error in the regression equation and therefore result in
unbiased estimates. Figure 2 shows the calculated series for the full sample.
Three points emerge from an examination of Figure 2. First, there is a clear downward
trend in the average rate on loans. Second, there are a number of outliers in the data. Third,
the downward trend in the second half of the period is less pronounced than in the first. The
1990s, particularly the second half, has been a period of low interest rates and consequently
less downward adjustment. We allow for these empirical features in the estimation.
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Table 7
Interest rate functions: GLS Panel estimation, 't' values in parenthesis
Variable Level Level Level
AR1
Differenced Differenced Differenced
AR1(12)
Intercept 4.889***
(7.44)
4.938***
(8.07)
4.18***
(5.93)
-.005***
(-4.15)
-.005***
(-4.33)
-.005***
(-4.01)
PF 1.209***
(9.78)
1.204***
(27.55)
1.121***
(26.78)
1.128***
(20.14)
1.083***
(29.09)
1.093***
(29.79)
MC 0.636***
(9.78)
0.628***
(10.52)
0.584***
(7.75)
0.564***
(4.75)
0.538***
(4.64)
0.576***
(5.16)
RISKASS -.016
(-0.16)
- - 0.250***
(2.83)
0.271***
(3.11)
0.220***
(2.61)
YEAR -.002***
(-7.43)
-.002***
(-8.07)
-.002***
(-5.93)
- - -
DUM92 -5.24***
(-6.80)
-5.22***
(-7.05)
-4.10***
(-4.81)
0.004***
(3.45)
0.004***
(3.71)
0.004***
(3.49)
PF*DUM92 .001
(0.01)
- - -.089
(-1.20)
- -
YEAR*DUM92 0.002***
(6.80)
0.003***
(8.07)
.002***
(4.81)
- - -
Log Likelihood 745.2 746.0 780.2 741.7 740.6 749.0
H0: AR = 0 5.6821 =χ
Reject
8.16212 =χ
Reject
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
The measure of the marginal cost of servicing loans and deposits is taken to be the
ratio of operating costs to total assets21. Table 7 presents some results.  Pre-testing of the
specification rejected the error components regression model. Table 7 presents the results
from panel GLS estimation with heteroskedasctic adjustment of the standard errors. Columns
2-4 report the results from estimation using levels.
Allowing for the possibility of unit roots in the variables we also estimate the
functions in first differences shown in columns 5-7. The results for the levels show that there
                                                
21 This assumes that marginal cost is proportional to average cost, which is consistent with CRS. However, this
assumption is questionable given that the results of Table 4 imply diseconomies of scale.
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was a discernible structural break in the 1990s in that there was a downward shift in interest
rates and the negative trend in the 1980s was neutralised in the 1990s. The results show a
value for 1γ  which is significantly different from unity confirming the findings of Table 5
that on the banks core business, the market could be described as monopolistic competition.
However, there was no significant difference in the coefficient on PF in the 1990s, which
means that there was no change in competitive conditions in the 1990s following the many
mergers and acquisitions of that period. Allowing for the possibility of other missing
variables or dynamic misspecification we also estimate the interest rate function with a
common AR1 parameter.  The null hypothesis that the first-order parameter is zero was
decisively rejected on a Chi-Square with one-degree-of-freedom of 68.5.
The results from first differencing the variables basically confirm the findings from
the levels, except that risk now appears as a significant variable and correctly signed. The
specification rejected a common first-order autocorrelation adjustment but accepted a panel
specific autocorrelation adjustment on a Chi-Square with 12 degrees of freedom of 16.822.
Again there was no evidence of a significant difference in the value of 1γ  between the two
periods.
6. Summary and Conclusions
We have investigated the competitiveness and market contestability of the major British
banks. The sample of banks bears a close correspondence to the major British Banking
Groups specified by the British Banking Association. The period of investigation was 1980-
2004 - a period that was punctuated with changes to legislation that affected banking business
culminating in a series of Building Society conversions, and bank mergers and acquisitions.
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Using the Rosse-Panzar methodology we find that the banking market in Britain is
one of monopolistic competition. This result is of no surprise as it confirms the findings of a
number of researchers. What is surprising is that following the number of mergers and
acquisitions by banks and newly converted banks, our findings suggest that competitive
conditions on the core business of banking (balance sheet business) has remained the same in
the 1990s and 2000s as in the 1980s.  This result is confirmed by estimating the ratio of the
Lerner indices of deposits to loans. A ratio strictly greater than unity is symptomatic of
monopoly or monopolistic competition. A ratio of unity is consistent with perfect
competition. Our results confirm that there was no significant change in the ratio of the
Lerner indices, indicating the continuing force of contestability. It is the credible threat of
entry into the mainstream area of banking business that has deterred any increase in anti-
competitive behaviour. Furthermore concentration has fallen moderately in the 1990s23,
suggesting that the mergers and acquisitions by the banks have been moderated by the new
entrants from demutualization.
An examination of bank total revenue using the Rosse-Panzar methodology suggests
that there was a significant worsening of competitiveness in the 1990s on the bank's non-core
business. Non-interest earnings amounted to between 30 and 35 per cent of gross revenue for
banks in 2004, which represents a significant source of income. How is it possible for
competitiveness to be unchanged in some products but worsen in others? The answer
according to Llewellyn (2005) is through the mechanism of 'bundling'. The purchase of one
bank service may be conditional on the purchase of another, which may deter the customers
from searching for the best individual product when in reality they purchase a bundle of
                                                                                                                                                       
22 It is very possible that the differencing operation induces panel specific autocorrelation by creating a moving
average error process in the bank specific component of the error term.
23 A feature also noted by Gondat-Larralde and Nier (2004) in their analysis of competition in the UK retail
banking market.
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products. The lack of competitiveness in the non-interest income segment of bank earnings
has seen British banks making a strategic decision to develop capital-free business to raise
ROE and the removal of assets from the balance sheet through securitization if they don't
meet target ROE. Llewellyn (2005) argues that this is a deliberate strategy of Economic
Value Added (EVA) by maximising shareholder value. Whatever the motivation, the re-
focussing of British banks in the non-interest earnings capacity of their enterprise will
eventually attract competition from new entrants or create the potential for the threat of entry.
29
Appendix I: Definitions of Variables
TREV = ratio of total bank revenue to total assets; INTREV = the ration of interest revenue to
total assets; PL = the ratio of personnel expenses to employees (unit price of labour); PK =
the ratio of capital expenses (the sum of depreciation on fixed assets and other operating
expense) to fixed assets (unit price of capital); PF = ratio of annual interest expenses to total
loanable funds (the sum of deposits and short term money market funding) - (unit price of
funds); RISKASS = ratio of provisions for contingent liability and loan losses to total assets;
ASSET = bank total assets; BR = ratio of number of branches of each bank to the total number
of branches of the whole banking system; ROA = net pre-tax profits to total assets.
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